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Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are increasingly challenged to demonstrate 
accountability and relevance, with reporting, monitoring and evaluation arguably having 
become development activities in their own right. Drawing on interviews and observation 
research, this article examines the impact of intensified monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) requirements on a number of South African NGOs. M&E – and the types of 
expertise, vocabularies and practices they give rise to – is an important area that is 
usually neglected in the study of NGOs but that significantly impacts on NGOs’ logic of 
operation. By focusing on three areas – data that is considered appropriate to conduct 
M&E, staffing and organizational cultures and NGOs’ reformist relationships with other 
civil society organizations (CSOs) – M&E is revealed as a central discursive element in 
the constitution of NGOs appropriate to neoliberal development. By engaging a neo-
Foucauldian framework of governmentality, M&E practices are thus understood as 





It is the weekly meeting of the health education team. There are forteen staff members in 
the large conference room discussing sample sizes, base line data and mixed 
methodologies. Emma, the content manager, has prepared tables of indicators which are 
projected on the wall as the health channel manager is giving a run-down of the new 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) guidelines required by one of the NGO’s major 
international funders. Funding mechanisms have just changed, and alongside them, so 
have reporting requirements and impact assessment. People’s eyes are glazing over as 
soon as S’bu begins speaking of heteroscedasticity.  
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Members of the designated research team that deals with monitoring and 
evaluation sit in on team meetings such as this one and occasionally speak up to clarify 
variables. They have backgrounds in psychology or economics, with high-level analytical 
and numerical skills. Judging by their facial expressions, most other staff members find 
this exercise both incomprehensible and irritating. Still, as the research manager puts it 
after the meeting, ‘sometimes people with money prefer numbers and graphs’.1 Later in 
the kitchen the head of the schooling campaign complains that funders just do not 
understand that education is a process. He used to be a teacher.  
This unremarkable scene took place in 2008 in the office of a large development 
NGO in Randburg, in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg, South Africa. The 
organization (‘Horizon’) is one of several NGOs examined in this article.2 It creates and 
delivers resources for schools and the health community through Information and 
Communication technologies (ICT) and other more conventional media. The organization 
was undergoing significant changes in project design and implementation at the time of 
research, partly due to shifting donor demands for monitoring and evaluating the impact 
of their development activities. But this article also draws on in-depth interviews with 
staff from other, often smaller, NGOs that carried out activities in the fields of capacity-
building and civil society strengthening. It explores how discourses and practices of 
M&E were employed by NGOs in relation to the impact data they produced, their 
organizational mode and how they positioned themselves in relation to the wider civil 
society sector. 
  Indeed, the article takes as its starting point the observation that NGOs in South 
Africa and elsewhere are increasingly challenged to demonstrate relevance and results 
due to the relative scarcity of development funds. Greater resources are allocated to M&E 
by NGOs but impact measurement is also becoming an ever-bigger priority for donors, 
                                                 
1 Interview with Director of Monitoring and Evaluation, Johannesburg, 1 February 2008. 
2 The data that has informed this article was mainly collected between February 2007 and March 
2009. I interviewed over 40 NGO professionals and a range of other development practioners. 
This was supplemented by observation research in NGOs and the analysis of documentary 
sources. A further round of semi-structured interviews was carried out in February and March 
2011 with South African Corporate Social investment (CSI) practioners, exploring their 
employers’ partnerships with NGOs and issues of funding and monitoring. Names of 
organizations and NGO professionals were anonymized unless written permission was given for 
the use of quotations. 
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some of which now stipulate that a certain percentage of the budget be spent on M&E.3 
In the case of United States Agency of International Development (USAID) grants to 
South African NGOs for example, M&E is to make up 9% of total project expenditure. 
Other grant-makers may not specify a percentage to be spent on M&E, but have in place 
systems for reporting that demand considerable NGO resources, such as the provision of 
extensive narrative reports, budgets and financial audits. What is more, most of the NGOs 
in this study can be characterised by increasingly complex funding and partnership 
arrangements that encompass private sector donors, collaborations with the public sector 
and other CSOs, as well as more traditional foreign donor support.4  
It is not only funding scarcity that has precipitated the growth in impact 
assessment. Transformations in public management over the past decade or more have 
put pressure on NGOs to prove good governance, accountability and cost-effectiveness. 
By the 1990s, what Power (1997) called the ‘audit explosion’ had also spread to the 
world of development. The need for the production of impact statistics has spawned a 
growing number of data collection instruments and indicators, and in some cases 
experimentation with different methods and measurement tools. M&E is also central to 
the aid reform agenda as stipulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and its 
associated changes in aid modalities, in that M&E can provide accountability and 
contribute to results-oriented development.5 The growing importance of M&E seems 
commonsensical – who could disagree with the need to demonstrate impact and being 
accountable to stakeholders. However, viewing the issue from within the logic of M&E 
neglects an analysis of power: what can be overlooked is not only how such 
measurements are done and who determines them, but also how their ubiquity enables 
particular roles for NGOs, shapes values and impacts on organizational cultures. 
                                                 
3 The title of this article reflects this trend, stemming from a press release of major funders 
operative in South Africa that read ‘Message to Africa: if you don’t count you don’t count’ (cited 
in Lehohla, 2007).  
4 The term ‘donor’ is thus used in this article to denote the whole gamut of grant-makers to 
NGOs. Where referring to the narrower meaning of foreign/ international donor agencies, this 
will be made explicit. 
5 The Paris Declaration of 2005 emphasises five principles to increase aid effectiveness: 
ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability. 
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My point of departure here is not that development projects were not assessed in 
the past.6 Rather, what is new is that reporting, monitoring and evaluation have become 
development activities in their own right. As such, they have become primary focus areas 
for international donors and increasingly also for Corporate Social Investment (CSI) 
programmes.7 Moreover, there now exists an industry of M&E training in South Africa, 
offering workshops, short courses and even degrees in monitoring and evaluation, which 
further underlines its ubiquity in the development sector. This paper thus examines M&E 
as an important area that is usually neglected in the study of NGOs and that significantly 
impacts on NGOs’ logic of operation and their positioning vis-à-vis other development 
actors. Impact measurement plays a key role in shaping NGOs’ everyday activities and 
the discursive strategies they employ to think through these activities (Ebrahim, 2003). 
Apparently mundane techniques like M&E are understood as political technologies 
through which governing is accomplished in an effectively trans-scalar development 
domain. Theoretically, my approach draws on the now substantial literature that applies a 
neo-Foucauldian framework of governmentality to the study of development (see e.g. 
Ferguson, 1990; Ferguson & Gupta, 2005; Li, 2007).8  
In line with this conception of power, I understand NGOs as amongst a 
multiplicity of development actors that apply diverse techniques and forms of knowledge 
to shape the conduct of others and themselves (Foucault, 1991). To govern in this sense 
involves the autonomy of the subjects of rule to choose freely how they conduct 
themselves, rendering central the practice of responsibilisation – of making individuals, 
communities or organizations responsible for their own change (Rose, 1999). M&E 
systems – and the types of expertise, vocabularies and practices they give rise to – are 
analysed as an example of techniques of calculation that are central to a neoliberal 
government rationality in the development domain and that shape behaviour by 
performance criteria. Far from being passively subjected to such practices of governing, 
                                                 
6 See Cracknell (2000) for a history of aid evaluation. 
7 CSI plays an increasingly important part in NGO funding in South Africa, accounting for R5.1 
billion in 2009 (De Wet, 2010). Corporations in South Africa rely on NGOs to deliver 
programmes for them under their corporate social responsibility mandates, while successive 
funding crises have in turn forced NGOs to increasingly seek out corporate funding. 
8 Examples of applying governmentality theory specifically to the operation of NGOs include 
Bryant (2002), Sending and Neumann (2006) and Postero (2007). 
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NGOs can be understood as brokers or ‘bridge builders’ that employ and circulate 
meanings and practices of development. The last section of this paper, on NGOs’ 
relationships with less formalized CSOs, argues that NGOs’ capacity and expertise in 
relation to M&E can contribute to shaping the organizational forms available to civil 
society – a process of civil society alignment referred to as NGO reformism.  
This study focuses on what I refer to as ‘intermediary’ South African NGOs. This 
terminology is intended to draw attention to the activities of the chosen NGOs in areas 
such as capacity building, research, lobbying, advocacy and training. It also emphasises 
that they provide a link between national and transnational actors, and organizations 
directly serving communities. All organizations in this study were blue-chip NGOs that 
were highly visible in the public sphere.9 They had multiple roles and functions: as 
Government watchdogs, campaigners, capacity-builders to civil society, partners to the 
corporate sector that relies on professionalized NGOs to deliver CSI programmes for 
them, and also as deliverer of services on behalf of Government. Moreover, what united 
the selected organizations was the pressure of having to cope with increasingly complex 
procedures for reporting and impact measurement, partly resulting from the multiple 
cross-sectoral partnerships and funding models they increasingly employed.  
At the outset, I wish to qualify my argument with two caveats. Firstly, carrying 
out multi-sited research into NGO practices requires an acknowledgement of the diversity 
of organizations considered. As I will show below, while M&E procedures were 
experienced negatively by many NGOs, they lent various forms of capital to others; 
certain technologies and vocabularies were adopted strategically and thus can be said to 
have ‘empowered’ yet others. The prevalence of a multiple partnership model in 
particular allowed some NGOs increased autonomy, especially in terms of the 
information they generated. Beyond recognising the heterogeneity of the South African 
NGO sector, this argument serves to highlight the indeterminate effects of particular 
development discourses and neoliberal techniques.  
                                                 
9 While this research does not claim to be representative of intermediary NGOs in South Africa, 
the organizations were selected because of their high status and visibility and because of their 
significance in the following areas: within the NGO sector as providing models and innovative 
approaches (e.g. in relation to partnerships and funding); in civil society as capacity-builders; and 
as influential on policy through research, lobbying and advocacy activities.  
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Secondly, the literature on M&E in NGOs provides examples of NGOs exercising 
significant control over a range of impact assessment methodologies (e.g. Giffen, 2009; 
Hailey et al., 2005; Holma & Kotinen, 2011). Somewhat contrary to these examples, 
M&E systems were determined by donors (whether international agencies or CSI 
funders) for the majority of the NGOs in this study. Some NGOs employed additional 
evaluation methods to assess the impact of their activities and to feed back to 
stakeholders, but donor-determined M&E shaped the development of future projects and 
the self-management of NGOs. In other words, there is a significant gap between the 
extensive debates and innovations surrounding evaluation, and actual M&E practices in 
the selected NGOs. Indeed, many practioners portray log frames and participatory M&E 
as opposites (and as neatly corresponding with quantitative and qualitative data, 
respectively). I am not reviewing the relative advantages of  each here (see Jacobs at al., 
2010, for example) but rather seek to demonstrate the effects of monitoring regimes on 
NGOs’ resources and mode of operation.  
The article proceeds as follows: the following section emphasises the importance 
of studying M&E in NGOs and sets out a theoretical framework. Perceptions of M&E by 
NGO professionals are subsequently discussed. I then turn to a discussion of the impact 
of M&E in three areas: on the data that is considered appropriate to conduct M&E, on 




STUDYING M&E IN NGOs: ACCOUNTABILITY AS A TECHNOLOGY OF 
POWER 
Although M&E is usually presented in tandem, it describes separate processes. 
Monitoring refers to the routine and continuous tracking of information about a project, 
often with a focus on outputs and collected for management and decision-making 
purposes. Evaluation consists of a periodic assessment of the outcomes, efficiency and 
impact of a project and is undertaken with a view to drawing lessons that may be more 
widely applicable. I take M&E to encompass both NGO-determined and externally-
determined systems; that is to say, donor accountability and NGO learning (James, 
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2009). Ideally, these two are meant to significantly overlap but as will become apparent 
this was not the reality portrayed by NGO staff.  
The principal evaluation criteria of M&E programmes, as set by the OECD 
(2002) and adopted by the majority of development agencies active in South Africa, are 
effectiveness, impact, relevance, sustainability and efficiency. CSI funders in South 
Africa tend to assess differently, focusing on the monitoring component of M&E and on 
tracking implementation – although this may be set to gradually change with CSI 
becoming more sophisticated. Besides providing NGOs with tools to measure programme 
effectiveness and efficiency, M&E is seen as beneficial in fostering public and political 
cooperation, supporting information needs for target audiences, promoting skills 
development and adaptive management and encouraging organizational learning 
(Bakewell et al. 2003). The latter, often associated with NGO-led monitoring, will be 
discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section. 
Indeed, methodology is one of the areas in which NGOs’ innovative potential is 
considered particularly important. Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation has seen 
attempts to include a range of stakeholders and develop new methods of impact 
measurement, seeking to locate knowledge production with the recipients of development 
(Conlin & Stirrat, 2008; Mebrahtu, 2004). Jacobs et al. (2010) distinguish between the 
following four types of participatory M&E methods: participatory rural appraisal 
(including social mapping); audio-visual tools (such as individual story-telling, 
participatory video etc); quantitative tools (such as community surveys); and 
anthropological techniques, such as participant observation. 
It is accountability, however, that has been the most important reason for 
extending impact measurement. Hulme and Edwards define accountability as ‘the means 
by which individuals and organizations report to a recognised authority (or authorities) 
and are held responsible for their actions’ (cited in Roberts et al. 2005: 1850). A 
distinction is often made between upward and downward NGO accountability. Although 
upward accountability is required by donors, this is not necessarily the case with 
downward accountability to CBOs or directly to beneficiaries, drawing attention to issues 
of inequality in development partnerships. 
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Alongside greater investment of resources into M&E, there has been significant 
growth in the literature on evaluation. Debates in recent years have addressed 
experimental evaluation (White, 2010), quantitative participatory methodologies 
(Chambers, 2010), feedback systems (Jacobs et al., 2010) as well as the continued 
dominance of logical framework analysis. The potentially vast gap between the learning 
needs of an organization and donor-led M&E is noted in a range of contributions. One 
study of M&E practices of British NGOs in Ethiopia identifies a lack of shared meanings 
of M&E: the further away from the field individuals were located, the more likely they 
were to emphasize the potential of M&E to feed into organizational learning; conversely, 
field staff were found to emphasise accountability to donors (Mebrahtu 2004). Bryant 
(2007) finds that NGOs with the least donor funding were the ones doing the most about 
evaluation – possibly because in the case of donor funding, the evaluation is treated as 
part of contract compliance and donor needs must be met, as opposed to fulfilling the 
learning needs of the organization.  
However, the afore-mentioned studies focus on INGOs operating in Africa as 
opposed to the South African organizations this research is concerned with. This 
distinction is significant as INGOs appear to be more likely to experiment with different 
methodologies.  Indeed, the present research demonstrates that while M&E practices 
become ever-more sophisticated it would appear that only particularly ‘capacitated’ 
organizations are in a position to employ more innovative methodologies. This is not to 
imply that smaller or community-based organizations cannot use alternative 
methodologies in principle. On the contrary, it is often in the context of NGOs’ reporting 
back to community stakeholders that innovate ways of documenting and measuring 
impact emerged, such as participatory video methodologies. A range of participatory 
M&E methods were also employed in their own debriefing and learning processes by 
some of the NGOs in this study. Crucially however, these were unlikely to be accepted 
by funding partners, especially where an organization had relatively little bargaining 
power. The existing literature on M&E in NGOs moreover does not take into account that 
NGOs need to increasingly demonstrate accountability to a diverse range of donors, 
including corporations and INGOs, and in a variety of formats.  
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One way of theoretically grappling with the issue of accountability is through an 
understanding of its associated practices as technologies of power. As for instance 
Strathern (2000) has shown, accountability has come to carry a whole range of practices, 
procedures and values. From this perspective, ever-more sophisticated auditing, 
monitoring and evaluation form part of a paradigm of knowledge which, concerned with 
quality control, good practice and economic efficiency, is specific to neoliberal forms of 
government. In the development domain, accountability is often understood in narrow 
financial terms and represented as a technical issue while assuming that the 
implementation of specific audit procedures will produce legitimacy.   
‘Rituals of verification’ (Power, 1997), such as M&E, are global phenomena that 
affect diverse domains and institutions, and have been connected to the rise and global 
spread of New Public Management (NPM). This reform agenda assumed that public 
services would be more effective if organized according to the principles of market 
economics and that the management of such marketized public services would be more 
efficient the more it resembled private sector management practices (Shore and Wright,  
2000). A new financial rationality was applied to organizations and their practices, with 
accounting providing a technology for ‘acting at a distance upon the actions of others’ 
(Rose, 1999: 152). The re-organization of public institutions and formerly extra-
economic domains according to such a financial rationality is enabled, as Miller (1994) 
has argued, by constructing calculable spaces that can be made governable through 
experts and expertise.  
Accordingly, accountability is one of the key concerns of neoliberal development, 
linking the discourse and practices of good governance on a global level with those of 
corporatist governance of NGOs; both are concerned with efficiency, good practice and 
inclusion. Intersectoral development partnerships – as one preferred mode of delivering 
development – encompass multiple levels of accountability that operate as channels for 
the circulation of particular managerial and auditing practices, connecting CBOs, NGOs, 
public and private sectors, donors and INGOs. 10 M&E practices are thus understood here 
as technologies of governing that enable the shaping of the behaviour of NGOs and their 
linking up with other national and global actors.  
                                                 
10 See Abrahmsen (2004) on the power of partnerships. 
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As already noted above, the concept of governmentality has been engaged to 
analyse how development relations provide a context for disciplinary practices, aimed at 
regulating social life by producing citizens. Therefore capacity building initiatives, as 
regularly sponsored by donors and implemented by NGOs in South Africa, can be 
understood as political interventions designed to produce modern economic. In the 
present context this theoretical approach is extended to explore the governing practices 
through which NGOs are to be made responsible, efficient and entrepreneurial. For the 
purposes of this paper, I am not concerned with the constitution of individuals as citizens 
or entrepreneurs (although this is clearly an absolutely central effect of NGOs’ work in 
development) but rather in M&E as one of the central discursive elements in the 
constitution of organizations appropriate to neoliberal development.  
 
 
NECESSARY EVIL OR LEARNING OPPORTUNITY: NGO PERCEPTIONS OF 
M&E 
This section focuses on organizational sustainability, organizational learning and power 
relationships with donors as the key themes affecting NGO professionals’ perceptions of 
M&E. The vast majority of interviewees experienced it as a ‘necessary evil’, 
‘burdensome’, ‘fixed’ and ‘rigid’. CSI approaches to M&E in particular were portrayed 
as lacking sophistication and predominantly tracking compliance. This is concurrent with 
the relative absence of debates on monitoring CSI in the literature.  
Sitting in on NGO meetings such as the one described earlier, I was often struck 
by the disdain with which staff greeted discussions about targets, indicators and impact 
measurement. ‘If we can’t give the numbers we don’t get the money’ was a complaint 
often voiced; the language of M&E was used ironically: ‘what do you call it, mixed 
methodology’. The perception of M&E as a ‘tick-box exercise’ and as a mechanism for 
uniformity conveyed a self-portrayal of NGOs as weak, with no agency and little power 
in hierarchical reporting structures. This construction can be contrasted with data gained 
from observation research: NGOs were constrained by donors, especially international 
agency funders, in certain ways. But they were also actively involved in the circulation of 
development concepts and techniques, especially in relation to their community-based 
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partners, as I will further discuss below. Also, NGO staff were dealing with the impact of 
M&E requirements in different ways and many creatively negotiated the constraints of 
their funder-partners’ demands.  
NGOs that are already better equipped to deal with stringent donor requirements 
are certainly in a better position to exploit the potential for organizational learning on 
their own terms. Within Horizon, there was constantly an effort to ‘piggy-back’ off 
research for funders. For instance, the organization measured socio-economic indicators 
that were not required by their foreign donors in order to seek further funding from other 
sources at a later stage. Piggy-backing thus constituted an attempt to bridge the gap 
between donors’ needs and whatever the NGO might be able to gain from collecting that 
information. Sitting in on meetings where M&E systems were planned, it often seemed as 
though measuring was done for measuring sake – even if it was unclear how particular 
data would contribute to project evaluation. Overall, there is evidence of a broader 
conceptualization of evaluation methods at Horizon and other already-capacitated 
organizations than at smaller organizations in this research. 
Whilst reporting was identified by all interviewees as increasing staff workload, it 
was nonetheless welcomed as positive by many. For example, Tom pragmatically saw 
M&E as an absolute necessity, arguing that without it his NGO would not exist. The 
increased donor emphasis on M&E was further positively associated with financial 
accountability, sound budgeting, project management skills and organizational learning, 
taking NGOs through a ‘budgeting exercise’ that ‘encourages rigour’.11 Successful 
compliance with strict reporting requirements presented a virtuous spiral for some as it 
could demonstrate financial accountability. The director of a Durban-based human rights 
NGO noted that ‘having a German funder, the audit and the accounting is very strict. So 
especially the EU funders say we could go with [this NGO] because they know the 
money is safe’.12 Conversely, an organization without a track record will find it more 
difficult to access any funds at all, whether from more traditional donors or through CSI. 
Corporate sector organisations in particular want to work with NGOs that are well-
                                                 
11 Interview with M. Oyedan, Director, Agenda, Durban, 27 June 2007 
12 Interview with NGO director, Durban, 25 June 2007 
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established and that have the ability to monitor and document their work in a way 
suitable to corporate standards and requirements. 
The link between monitoring and sustainability is an important one. It accounts 
for why some NGOs understand externally-determined monitoring practices as 
productive despite the added strain on organizational capacity. In addition to establishing 
a track record, continuous assessment of one’s impact can ensure that an NGO remains 
competitive: ‘[monitoring] is a key part because we need to constantly better ourselves. 
Because we may be unique today, but tomorrow we’re not unique’.13 The sentiment 
about improving oneself that is expressed by this director of an education NGO points to 
organizational learning as a key aspect of both donor-led and NGO-determined M&E. 
But the phrase ‘to better oneself’ also echoes neoliberal thinking on individual and 
organizational obligations of self-government and responsibilisation. From this 
perspective, organizational learning can be seen as a government rationality that is 
concerned with NGOs’ capacities to reform themselves.  
Framing learning in this way raises a number of issues. In this case, the 
organization learnt financial accountability through continuous monitoring. Auditing 
techniques or project management strategies were sometimes highlighted as outcomes of 
organizational learning processes that evolved through collaboration with donors. While 
these are undeniably important organizational skills, they only address the managerial 
aspect of an NGO’s work. Organizational learning is constructed in technical, 
administrative and financial terms. Indeed, accountability itself is understood as a 
technical or managerial issue, a tool with which certain outputs can be achieved. It has 
been noted that the automatic preference of an audit form of accountability often goes at 
the expense of evaluation as learning (James, 2009). Audit systems might then impede 
genuine learning, since their main function is to highlight the short-term success of a 
project (Ebrahim, 2003). This again speaks to the tension between externally-led and 
NGO-determined M&E. 
There are significant differences between individual funders’ requirements and 
approaches to reporting. Bi- and multilateral donors such as the EU or USAID were 
described as having the most ‘unreasonable expectations’, as some put it, demanding 
                                                 
13 Interview with NGO director, Johannesburg, 10 March 2008 
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extended paperwork and exact adherence to formalistic demands. Some NGO directors 
had taken conscious decisions not to engage with this set of funders at all. CSI reporting 
was perceived as most clearly divorced from the learning needs of NGOs; here, 
monitoring was portrayed as simplistic, for example consisting of producing 
‘photographs with Mandela outside the school they just paid for somewhere in the 
Eastern Cape’.14 Other donors, for instance the Ford or Mott Foundations and some of the 
grant-making Northern NGOs, were characterised as more adaptable and culturally-
sensitive, often including knowledge-sharing workshops, local personnel and greater 
methodological flexibility.  
Perceptions of the unilateralism of reporting, vis-à-vis a more genuine 
transformative learning process persisted amongst practioners, however. Concerns were 
frequently voiced about the paternalism of foreign donor-led M&E, which seemed to 
imply that ‘Africa is unable to evaluate’.15 The fact that development indicators are set by 
donor agencies which are situated outside of the country does indeed raise questions 
about what comes to constitute development knowledge and how it is measured. More 
generally, this point is a reminder of the fact that M&E is necessarily shaped by relations 
of power. Decisions about what and how to monitor reflect the power relations that also 
underpin other development activities and relationships.  
Personal relationships operated as disturbing factors, which mediated the regimes 
that govern evaluating and reporting. Personal relationships and networks are of course a 
factor in mediating NGO-donor relationships elsewhere, too. However, in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa they are profoundly significant both due to a shared history of the liberation 
struggle and the effects of the fairly common career progression of activists from NGO 
employment into public sector. The overall perception of M&E as homogenizing 
therefore does not imply that there is a single determinate outcome of this mode of NGO 
governance; the relative autonomy of NGOs can be both increased and restricted by 
intensified reporting demands. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Interview with Director of Governance Programme, Cape Town, 23 April 2007 
15 Interview with Director of M&E, Johannesburg, 1 February 2008 
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WORKING WITH PROCESS: ISSUES OF MEASURABILITY 
Some of the inherent challenges and limitations of monitoring and evaluating 
development work are well-documented in the literature and include the non-linearity of 
political change, the complexity of contextual variables and issues around methodology, 
attribution, resources and timings (Bakewell & Garbutt, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2010). In this 
section, I have limited myself to discussing two points only in relation to the 
measurability of development impact that were frequently raised by NGO professionals: 
first, log frames and their continued perception as limiting, for example in relation to the 
exclusion of qualitative data; and second, the perception of reporting requirements 
favouring product output. Ebrahim’s (2003) distinction between product data and process 
data is useful for this discussion. Product data is generated about physical and financial 
details, focusing on easily measurable indicators and quantitative analysis; process data 
about qualitative dimensions of NGOs’ work is context-specific and interpretative in 
nature. 
The most common type of product data analysis for the NGOs in this study was 
logical framework analysis (LFA). The log frame matrix was first introduced by USAID 
and became the standard approach for planning, approving and monitoring development 
work as part of the shift to results-based management. ‘Managing for results’ also 
constitutes a key principle of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and its 
associated aid modalities (Holvoet & Rombouts, 2008). The 4x4 matrix accommodates 
goals, outcomes, outputs and activities of a given project for which information can be 
given in a narrative description, objectively verifiable indicators of success, means of 
verification and assumptions and risks.  
Log frames were usually described negatively by staff as limiting and 
prescriptive. Similarly, the M&E literature increasingly discusses methodologies such as 
LFA as simplistic approaches and portrays as widespread the use of more innovative 
alternatives. The fact that recent debates in impact evaluation have focused on the 
limitations of quantitative methodologies seems to imply that the former are no longer 
commonplace in NGO practice (Conlin & Stirrat, 2008). Yet, despite extensive 
criticisms, LFA and similar results-based methodologies continue to be the most-widely 
used monitoring tool for foreign donors, INGOs and for some of the biggest corporate 
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sector funders in South Africa. According to donors (many of whom take on board NGO 
critiques around measurability), a log frame is not intended to include every detail of the 
project but rather to function as a logical summary of its key factors.  
NGO professionals reported to be excluding qualitative types of data because they 
saw much of what they understand to be at the core of their work, such as participatory 
work with communities or education workshops, as not fitting into a log frame matrix. 
Participatory monitoring can address some of these perceived limitations; indeed, 
participatory processes can be employed to identify indicators and objectives, in order to 
then develop the log frames (Jacobs et al., 2010). This was not reflected in NGO practice 
however, not least because limited resources and capacity often make for an either/or 
scenario in terms of monitoring. As noted earlier, the majority of NGO staff were aware 
of a whole range of alternative methodologies (indeed often using them in their internal 
evaluations), but were not able to employ them in their reports to donors. Moreover, 
having to sum up key factors in the log frame format was seen to lend a specific focus to 
a project, even when the NGO had no intention to reduce the project to these key factors. 
Having to fit proposals into fixed grids appeared not only to prescribe how results were 
reported but also to predetermine them, with little space to evaluate secondary or 
unexpected outcomes.  
Turning next to the issue of product output, current reporting requirements lend 
themselves to manufacturing discrete NGO products as opposed to more complex 
development processes. Most obviously, donor-led project evaluation tends to over-
emphasise quantitatively measurable outcomes and measuring predefined products (such 
as numbers of computers or schools). This emphasis was particularly noticeable with 
corporate donors and CSI projects. Taking the example of the NGO described in the 
introduction, monitoring for its funders assessed how many people had been in contact 
with the NGO’s health education outputs.16 Discussions about the various channels and 
projects were framed in terms of targets and sites and the number of individuals passing 
through community centres. Consequently, NGO expertise was required in technical 
                                                 
16 Some funders of health education monitor the number of individuals that are accessed through 
community outreach, which requires the use of facilitators. In this way, the obvious gap between 
the number of individuals simply being present and those actively engaging with educational 
content is to be overcome. 
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domains (such as content production and delivery, or IT) and in the NGO’s research 
department, with the organizational focus on fixing areas identified as monitoring priority 
by the funders.  
Where an organizational focus on product information already existed, as in the 
case of ‘new-generation’ NGOs, there are greater consistencies between funders and 
NGO, and less of a need for the NGO to redefine its understanding of success based on 
funding requirements.17 As is frequently noted in the literature reviewed above, the short-
termism of development grants further exacerbates the problem of the exclusion of data, 
since developmental change – if it can be measured at all – does not happen within one- 
or two year budgetary cycles. The demands of multisectoral partnerships, as increasingly 
commonplace development delivery modes for intermediary NGOs, intensify this timing 
challenge since corporate sector donors have particularly short time frames and usually 
want to see the rapid implementation and success of highly visible projects.  
But the emphasis on product output also applies to marketable products such as 
media platforms, publications and so on. Indeed, commercialisation can form part of an 
NGO’s sustainability strategy, involving the development of profitable activities by 
charging for consulting, training or in recent years increasingly grant-managing. 
Commercialisation is moreover encouraged by donors in other areas, such as NGOs 
charging for capacity building workshops. Impact assessment of capacity-building is 
arguably more complex, as it encompasses intrinsically intangible processes (Hailey et 
al., 2005).  
The principle of commodification constitutes an important part of the ongoing 
transformation of development into a competitive market, and of NGOs into enterprising, 
competitive organizations. This shift impacts on how NGOs conceptualise the 
development projects they develop and implement. Whether a ‘development solution’ is 
marketable as a product becomes an important criterion in the conception of projects. For 
                                                 
17 I use the term ‘new-generation NGO’ as a shorthand to describe organizations that emerged in 
recent years as well as older ones that were able to survive the sector’s funding crises and 
successfully navigated shifting Post-Apartheid development modalities. The concept emerged 
from the observation that many NGO staff described funding modalities, sustainability 
approaches and organizational practices in opposition to a more traditional NGO model – one 




example, Horizon explicitly framed its development project as the ‘Horizons solution’. 
This language points to practices of problematization and ‘rendering technical’ that are 
central to a neoliberal rationality: the constitution of an object of thought and 
identification of a problem as linked to the availability of a solution (Foucault, 1989). 
Problematization moreover serves to confirm expertise and sets up boundaries between 
expertise- and capacity- haves and have-nots. As the examples in this section 
demonstrate, M&E practices both constitute and produce specific forms of expertise and 
knowledge. It is these forms of expertise that I will turn to in the next section. 
 To reiterate from the above, the contention in the M&E literature that rigid 
measurement formats are being phased out does not hold up in the South African 
development domain where they continue to be used by many major donors as well as by 
corporate grant-makers, the latter particularly emphasizing quantitatively measurable 
outputs. Indeed, while harmonization as a key aim of the Paris Declaration and Accra 
Agenda for Action is intended to reduce the transaction costs arising from dealing with a 
variety of donors, formats and procedures, it may well lead to a resurgence of 
technocratic approaches to M&E. Moreover, the increasing importance of CSI funding 
for intermediary NGOs has implications for how NGOs conceptualize the impact and 
effectiveness of their interventions.  
  
 
TYPES OF EXPERTISE AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 
M&E requirements affect NGOs not only by favouring particular ways of measuring the 
impact of a project, but also by influencing organizational culture, as this section will 
argue. Specific capacities, resources and skills are needed for an NGO to be able to fulfil 
donors’ data requirements, and to qualify for further funding. It is important to stress that 
participatory M&E, whether donor-led or NGO-determined, also necessitates specific 
types of expertise for which capacities must be created; participatory methodologies are 
also governmental. The data presented here can thus be contrasted with much of the 
literature on participatory M&E that assumes, as Jacobs et al. put it, ‘an idealised 
commitment to participatory practice, and that managers have the time and resources to 
invest in it’ (2010: 40). 
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Measurable outputs are recent donor requirements and require capacities that did 
not fall within the core expertise of many NGOs in this study. PEPFAR’s (2007) manual 
for implementation partners in Southern Africa is instructive in this regard as it outlines 
the features of a successful M&E unit, indicating the types of NGO expertise required: 
epidemiological expertise, social science expertise, data processing and statistical 
expertise, and data dissemination expertise. The infrastructural and informational 
resources that are required for this kind of M&E include data dissemination systems, 
centralised databases and second generation-surveillance. Most NGOs lacked the 
resources to attract this type of capacity, especially given the South African context of 
brain drain. 
For larger organizations in this study, increased reporting requirements 
necessitated the hiring of new staff to cope with the added workload. Personnel with 
high-level quantitative-analytical skills were increasingly sought after by NGOs. This can 
result in a shifting of the balance between project staff and support staff, the latter 
including administrators and accountants, but in some cases also psychologists and 
statisticians. What is more, by needing to employ people with quantitative-analytical 
skills, NGOs increasingly compete for staff with corporations and effectively have to pay 
higher salaries. Aside from an added strain on financial resources, this can adversely 
affect organizational culture as certain skills come to be seen as of higher value, as 
Ebrahim (2003) and Roberts et al. (2005) have demonstrated.  
In the smaller NGOs in this study, it was usually the director that took care of 
fundraising and reporting. Where possible, auditing was outsourced because those skills 
were not available inside the NGO. Generally speaking smaller NGOs, not being able to 
spend the same resources and budget on M&E, were most negatively affected by 
monitoring regimes, as this director of a research and policy NGO with considerable 
M&E expertise acknowledged: ‘[monitoring] becomes so complicated that it has 
excluded large numbers of CBOs from actually being able to understand and fulfil the 
requirements. Completing log frames, and all sorts of things. Even we sometimes have 
difficulties meeting those very stringent requirements’.18  
                                                 
18 Interview with A. Motala, Executive Director, CSVR, Johannesburg, 2 May 2007 
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Given that the vast majority of intermediary NGOs in this research relied on local 
CBO partners, the issue raised in the above extract is vital. CBOs are usually 
contractually obliged by NGOs to provide financial reports, narrative reports and annual 
financial statements, which the NGOs then report upwards to their grant-makers. In this 
regard, the relationship of accountability and its associated requirements mirrors that of 
NGOs to their donors. As I will discuss below, NGOs can come to play the role of an 
educator or translator in their relationships with community-based organizations, 
employing M&E techniques as part of their own reformist practices within civil society.  
 But expertise is also required and produced in relation to the language of (funded) 
development, as the leader of a mid-size research NGO in Durban stressed: ‘This is the 
terminology [...] from the OECD, so we must use it. If you do not fit in it word for word, 
it is immediately rejected’.19 As with any other language, failure to speak it properly 
means being excluded from the conversation; that is to say being excluded from funding 
flows. Conversely, entering into funding arrangements requires a high level of buzzword 
fluency. NGO staff reported that they were increasingly required by grant-makers to 
attend courses on how to complete grant applications or monitoring documents. 
Importantly for the argument put forward here, such training for purposes of tendering or 
reporting was framed in terms of capacity building while it is highly specific managerial 
skills that are transferred. Skills-oriented learning and human resource development were 
regularly conflated with developing staff capacities according to project-related or 
organizational needs. Forms of shallow capacity building are central to what Ong (2006) 
refers to as optimizing technologies at the heart of neoliberalism. 
 Besides having to be well-versed in current development terminology, perfect 
command of English in a professional and bureaucratic context is necessary. This ability 
is helped by being a native English speaker, which in South Africa often means being 
middle-class and urban; conversely, less professionalized or rural civil society 
organizations are disadvantaged. Class position impacts on the ability to speak the 
language of efficiency and may exclude certain organizations entirely from funding 
flows. At a more general level, class position marginalises certain issues from the field of 
activity of professionalized NGOs. For instance, first-generation human rights issues 
                                                 
19 Interview with NGO director, Durban, 28 June 2007 
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connected to political liberty seemed to exercise many NGOs more than socio-economic 
rights.20 It is NGOs’ relationships with organizations who precisely struggle for socio-
economic justice that will be addressed in the next section.  
 
 
LEARNING HOW THINGS OPERATE: NGOS’ RELATIONSHIPS WITH 
OTHER CSOs 
I now turn to the effects of intensified monitoring and evaluation regimes on NGOs’ 
relationships to other CSOs. The key issue in this section is how NGOs, through the 
employment of M&E techniques, might ‘conduct the conduct’ of community-based 
organizations and social movements that they work with.  
Writers such as Habib (2003) emphasise the plurality of South African civil 
society, suggesting that Post-Apartheid civil society is made up of three blocs: formalized 
NGOs, ‘survivalist’ community organizations and social movements. The selected NGOs 
are part of the former category: as outlined above, all had international linkages and 
diverse sources of income from donors, the private sector and Government contracts; all 
worked, to some extent, with community-based organisations. The NGOs would describe 
themselves as progressive, playing advocacy and lobbying roles in relation to issues of 
socio-economic justice and human rights. A number of them directly supported social 
movements that challenge Government policy on service delivery, either by providing 
financial or legal resources or through campaigning and publicity work.  
I will highlight three interconnected aspects about M&E that I see as central to the 
relationships of the NGOs in this study with other types of CSOs. At the most basic level, 
NGOs that had entered into funding regimes found it increasingly difficult to work with 
less formalised organizations that are not structurally equipped to prove results-based 
management or adhere to complex reporting systems. As the director of an organization 
                                                 
20 For example, this is evident in the observation that it was seemingly only with the 
Government’s assault on the mainstream media – in 2005, the ANC obtained a gagging order 
against the Mail & Guardian over ‘Oilgate’ and also threatened Business Day and the Sunday 
Times with legal action over articles following up on the story – that many formal NGOs began to 
become aware of the realities of repression and of freedom of expression issues faced by social 




that provides education and research for labour and social movements put it, ‘we only 
work with the ones who do have a photocopying machine, who can account for all the 
money’.21  
Second, NGOs sometimes end up playing a translation role vis-à-vis less 
professionalized CSOs. For instance, participatory processes may be used to design and 
monitor programmes by their local partner, but NGO staff repackage the stakeholder 
process in a log frame format for their donors. This process of translation produces a 
hierarchy that establishes the NGO as expert, with the power to represent a CBO’s 
activities and development objectives. 
 This leads to the third point that capacity building in civil society was considered 
by most NGOs in this study as one of their primary roles: ‘we recognise that some of the 
CBOs do not have the resources or capacity to do everything we expect them to do, so we 
bring in the resources including financial resources, but we also help to build capacity’.22 
The role of this and similar intermediary NGOs consists of organizationally developing 
the capacity of local organizations that then do the ‘actual work’.23 The reclassification of 
South Africa as middle-income economy and subsequent funding crisis has moreover led 
many blue-chip NGOs to follow the market and work outside of South Africa. Project 
development for Southern Africa is required by some foreign donors, and NGOs both 
rely on local partners and carry out capacity building programmes: 
  
We have got a product, which we have used in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola and 
the DRC, where we go in for a year and train NGOs and build capacity and one 
week its advocacy, next it’s admin, the next week it’s dealing with the press, the 
next week it’s whatever.24 
 
 Here, the concept of what NGOs should be and how they should operate – doing 
advocacy, being professional, organized and media-savvy – is exported into the Southern 
African region. Organizations are to attain administrative and financial skills and are 
                                                 
21 Interview with L. Gentle, Director, ILRIG, Cape Town, 24 April 2007 
22 Interview with NGO director, Johannesburg, 14 March 2007 
23 Interview with Senior Researcher, Durban, 25 June 2007 
24 Interview with Director of Governance Programme, Cape Town, 23 April 2007 
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trained in media work, research and monitoring capacity. Particular vocabularies, 
techniques and types of expertise are circulated through capacity building programmes 
and NGO networks; capacity building and organizational learning (re)produce 
organizations with similar characteristics. An analysis of capacity-building thus raises 
important questions about the pedagogical role of NGOs.  
The civil society dynamics documented above are sometimes captured under the 
heading of the ‘NGO-isation’ of civil society – the potential for formalisation and 
professionalization inherent in CSOs’ accessing of funds (often, but not always, from 
formal NGOs).25 But civil society relations are also characterised by a pedagogical drive 
of NGOs wanting to shape civil society organizations ‘in their image’ – a process I refer 
to as reformism. Reformism is linked to, but distinct from processes of NGO-isation in 
that I conceive of the former as concerned with behaviours and mindsets. Importantly, 
NGOs’ reformism does not necessarily lead to NGO-isation. As I have argued more fully 
elsewhere (Mueller-Hirth, 2009), NGOs act as experts which transfer how effective 
development work is to be done. The concept of reformism is suggested because the 
notion of an ideological co-option of the struggle by NGOs, as it is often put forward by 
activists, arguably does not fully capture the complex practices of civil society alignment 
in terms of M&E technologies, information systems, vocabulary and so on.  
The key point here is that M&E practices are entangled with processes of 
reformism. M&E is internalised and becomes a prime indicator of improved capacity that 
coexists alongside the rhetoric of partnership. Institutionalised expertise can serve as a 
channel for governing practices and the responsibilisation of civil society. The need for 
audit expertise influences NGOs’ positioning towards their civil society counterparts and 
therefore has the potential to establish hierarchies and contribute to the 
institutionalization of community struggles. 
 
                                                 
25 The NGO-isation of social movements has been well-documented in a variety of settings, such 
as Palestine (Smith 2007), Latin America (Alvarez 1999) and Russia (Richter, 2006). Although 
overwhelmingly perceived as negative by activists from social movements and CBOs interviewed 
for this study, NGO meditation clearly offers opportunities to bring issues that affect poor 
communities to the attention of policy-makers. Moreover, despite many examples of NGOs 
‘speaking for’ social movements and CBOs (also see Zikode, 2008), some of the prominent social 
movements in South Africa have strategically worked with progressive NGOs who have 




In this paper I have emphasised the need for studying auditing techniques in NGOs as a 
central aspect of their work that impacts on the way they think about their activities, on 
their logic of operation and their location in wider civil society. I have explored some of 
the types of expertise that auditing requires and produces. These include, as a minimum, 
language skills (including fluency in ‘developmentese’), financial expertise, data 
processing and dissemination skills and quantitative-analytical capacities. Increasingly, 
NGOs are expected to be efficient financial managers in addition to, or perhaps as 
opposed to, being efficient at what it is that they do as their ‘core business’. Calculative 
practices such as M&E require specific skills and capacities which produce an ideal-
typical model of Post-Apartheid NGO that is streamlined, flexible and responsible and 
able to research, count and audit correctly. The time and resources spent on donor-led 
monitoring diverts from NGOs’ core activities but also from evaluating their work in 
self-determined (and potentially more innovative) ways.  
At the same time, it is important to stress that, although NGOs in this study were 
constrained by auditing technologies, the outcomes of these practices are far less uniform 
and secure. NGO staff often discussed M&E rather stereotypically, in terms of donors 
demanding quantitative data and the NGO wanting to express complex issues. Indeed, 
results-based methodologies such as log frames do not lend themselves to expressing 
complex project realities, tending to obscure project aims perceived as political, 
contentious or simply ambivalent; structural relations are excluded from evaluation and 
from future project design. Despite the prevalence of discourse and practices of 
partnership, there remains a fundamental tension between externally-determined and 
NGO-led M&E. 
However, a more nuanced picture also emerged in this research. Firstly, M&E 
formats varied from funder to funder, and between different types of donor. Secondly, the 
more capacity an NGO has the more it is able to use M&E as a resource. This is well 
encapsulated in the concept of ‘piggy-backing’ that was significant in a number of the 
NGOs discussed above. Reporting and monitoring regimes work much more as 
disciplining mechanisms where there is no capacity. So-called new-generation NGOs are 
set up to deal with such challenges more effectively. Nonetheless, monitoring and 
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evaluation necessitates the acquisition of specific types of expertise. The adoption of 
multisectoral funding models puts further strain on NGO resources and demands 
organizational and methodological flexibility. 
 It is hard to disagree with demands for greater accountability of NGOs and with 
the adaptation of systems that can demonstrate transparency and reduce transaction costs 
of development projects. Nonetheless, it is far from clear what this accountability means 
given the impact of auditing practices on NGOs as they were presented here, and whether 
more (or more sophisticated) auditing or reporting systems result in better development 
work. Demands for accountability and transparency are ultimately connected to claims of 
empowerment and the democratisation of development. Quite contrary to such claims, 
monitoring was shown to potentially exacerbate hierarchies within civil society and to 
exclude certain organizations altogether. Fluency in the language and practices of M&E 
displays accountability and transfers legitimacy. NGOs’ role as a translator of monitoring 
techniques to their community-based partners is central to this hierarchy of legitimacy.  
As I have sought to show in this paper, the implementation of extensive 
monitoring systems necessitates organizational restructuring and the acquisition of 
specific types of (mainly quantitative-analytical) expertise. M&E practices moreover 
require certain organizational conditions which favour and indeed produce highly 
organized and professionalized types of NGOs, whilst marginalising others. Intermediary 
NGOs such as the ones considered in this research are broadly favoured by the current 
reporting regimes: research NGOs for instance already have the research and reporting 
expertise that help with M&E requirements.  
Given that auditing changes the very organizational structures of those required to 
audit, there is a danger of even progressive organizations becoming integrated in terms of 
their modus operandi into the neoliberal order they set out to change. The vast amounts of 
time and resources that are required by auditing put such strain on organizational capacity 
that they actually slow down or indeed prohibit genuine NGO activity. What impact 
measurement then ultimately produces is NGOs that are effective in terms of 
management, governance and audit, but not effective at their core mission. This is 
particularly regrettable in the case study context of South Africa given the vast 
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developmental challenges and inequalities facing South Africa and the deeply felt 
betrayal of freedom’s promises by the majority population. 
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